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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 03/03/2004

Accident number: 397

Accident time: 15:20

Accident Date: 01/05/2003

Where it occurred: Demining group's head
office, Tyre
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident

Country: Lebanon
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 19/05/2003

ID original source: BoI:002/2003: MJF

Name of source: MACC SL

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Fuze

Ground condition: not applicable

Date record created: 28/02/2004

Date last modified: 28/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 3

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR 36 70552 68324

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: UNIFIL

Map series: GENIMAP
Map sheet: A (Tibnin)

Map edition:
Map name: 1:50,000

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
dog missed mine (?)

Accident report
What follows is the original Board of Inquiry report, edited for anonymity and with excess
pictures removed.
REPORT FOR MINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No002/2003
MINE Accident that occurred in on the 01st May 2003.
Map References UNIFIL Genimap 1:50,000 Sheet A (Tibnin).
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Introduction
1. In accordance with National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC SL
Programme Manger issued a verbal Convening Order Instruction on Thursday 01st May
2003, for a Mine Accident Investigation.
2. This is a comprehensive report by the MACC SL QA Officer into the Mine Accident that
occurred on the 01st May 2003. Based on the investigation, [Demining group]’s Accident
Report (Annex A details), [Demining group]’s Investigation Report (Annex B) visits to the
accident site, visits to the demining worksite and the photos from the accident site and
demining worksite, the accident is considered preventable.
3. The information provided by [Demining group] to the MACC SL QA Section in the “IMSMA
Accident and Casualty Reports”, attached at Annex C is confirmed. The accident occurred at
approximately 1520hrs on the 01st May 2003, at [Demining group]s Head Office in Tyre
Southern Lebanon, GR 36 70552 68324 (seat of detonation); Annex D details a map of the
general area.

Events leading up to the Accident
4. On the morning of 01st May 2003 at approximately 0935hrs having completed the Quality
Assurance (QA), Mine Detection Dog (MDD) Evaluations, QA MDD Officer [the Victim]
departed Minefield (M/F), 288 at Majda Zun and proceeded to M/F 1272 at Tayr Harfa,
arriving there at approximately 0945hrs. On arrival at site it was ascertained that the MDD
Team (call-sign MDD2), was finishing their work for the day and were measuring up the area
for the Daily Work Report statistics.
5. Whilst this was taking place MDD Handler [name excised] noticed a “shining metal
object”, next to the M/F perimeter fence, that he recognised to be the igniter from an Israeli
No4 AP Mine. The MDD was withdrawn and on closer inspection it was ascertained that “the
collar and safety pin were missing and the firing pin was in”. The igniter was then picked
up, carried across the searched area and then placed on the bund adjacent to the Command
Post (CP). Site Supervisor [name excised] was then informed via the site radios, whereupon
MDD Handler [name excised] continued with his work.
6. Following the passage of information from MDD Handler to Site Supervisor [name
excised] of the found igniter, both Site Supervisor [name excised] and QA MDD Officer [the
Victim] then went to the area to inspect the igniter. Site Supervisor [name excised] noticed
that “the retaining plate was missing”, whereupon he proceeded to pick the igniter up and
“unscrewed the detonator from the mechanism using Leatherman tools to inspect the
inside”. On inspection of the inside it was noticed that the “percussion cap was hit by the
striker and had left a distinct dent on the cap”. Unfortunately Site Supervisor [name
excised] “overlooked the fact that the detonator wasn’t damaged in any other way to
indicate that it was free from explosives”. Site Supervisor then proceeded to screw back
on the detonator to the igniter body, using only his fingers.
7. QA MDD Officer [the Victim] then asked if he could retain the igniter, whereupon Site
Supervisor [name excised] “handed it over to him thinking that it was safe to do so”. QA
MDD Officer [the Victim] then proceeded to take the igniter and at approximately 1155hrs
departed the site to move back to [Demining group] Office in Tyre.
8. At approximately 1500hrs QA MDD Officer [the Victim] entered the [Demining group]
Office, after completing some administrative duties he then approached QA Officer [name
excised] with the igniter (minus the detonator). On inspection of the igniter QA Officer [name
excised] “noticed that the striker and spring easily slipped out of the igniter body”, also
commenting that “the igniter was in a very good condition”; the igniter was then handed
back to QA Officer [the Victim].
9. At approximately 1520 hrs QA MDD Officer [the Victim] was leaving the [Demining group]
Office proceeding along the corridor; he reached into his pocket for his cigarettes as he
intended to have a smoke. When he placed his hand in his pocket he “felt the other
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component i.e. the detonator”, he then proceeded to take out the detonator and because
he had been told that it was safe “proceeded to fit it back together, then there was a loud
explosion noise”.
Note: The [quotations] detailed have been extracted directly from the signed witness
statements; full details are contained at Annex’s A and B to this report.
Accident Details
10. Following the accident, QA MDD Officer [the Victim] managed to move back towards the
office main door whereupon he was assisted initially by QA MDD Officer [name excised] and
then by all other [Demining group] personnel present. After the initial on-site stabilisation, QA
MDD Officer [the Victim] was then taken to the Najem Hospital in Tyre.
11. On arrival at Najem Hospital in Tyre, QA MDD Officer [name excised] was transferred to
the casualty department where he received emergency first aid, underwent x-ray’s of the
injured hand and was admitted into theatre at 1600hrs.

BOI Post Accident Activities and General Observations 01.05.03
12. On arrival at the accident scene and after an initial briefing by Programme Manager, it
was ascertained that the accident scene had been made secure by [the Demining group].
During the inspection of the accident scene the following observations were established:
• There had been an uncontrolled detonation of an Israeli No9 Igniter in the corridor
leading to [the Demining group’s] Office in Tyre.
• Remnants of the No9 Igniter body were located in the corridor. No “U” shaped striker
retaining plate, safety pin or safety collar were however located.
• The accident occurred midway along the corridor.
• QA Officer [the Victim] had received initial medical treatment just inside the door of
the [[Demining group] Office in Tyre.
• No other items of ordnance or explosive devices were involved.
13. As an aid to the investigation, all items and areas pertaining to the investigation were
numbered, photographed in-situ and all details taken. The breakdown of items and areas are
detailed as follows:
•

No1 - No9 Igniter main body.

•

No2 - Approximate location of the accident.

•

No3 - Area where QA MDD Officer [the Victim] received initial medical treatment.

•

No4 - Location of QA [name excised]’s work-station (nearest person to the accident).

•

N05 - Items of the No9 Igniter fragmented detonator body collected by the BOI in the
corridor.

•

No6 - Items of the No9 Igniter fragmented detonator body and main body collected by
the BOI in the corridor.

VIEW OF ITEM NO6 (ITEMS OF THE NO9 IGNITER FRAGMENTED DETONATOR BODY
AND MAIN BODY)

[The main body was not destroyed in the detonation.]
[Other demining group]’s Clearance Operation and Clearance Statistics for M/F 1272
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14. Clearance commenced on M/F 1272 on the 09th December 2002, with [the demining
group being subjected to QA] clearance being conducted as per the initial MACC SL
Clearance Plan. Once the known contaminated area had been cleared and all the mines
located as per the Israeli Force record, there was an issue on the 18th March 2003 of a
MACC SL Site Specific Clearance Plan, for the remainder of the area that had been
inadvertently covered by stone spoil by civilian contractors.
15. Briefly, the Site Specific Clearance Plan detailed that the stone spoil area be
mechanically collected, graded (20cm thickness), flailed (at least three times) and finally
cleared using MDD assets. It was during this final phase of the operation that the No9 Igniter
was located by MDD Handler. Annex E details M/F 1272 Site Specific Clearance Plan.
16. Up to the date of the accident the following statistics for M/F 1272 have been confirmed:
• Manual Clearance x 730m2.
• Mechanical Preparation x 7946m2.
• MDD Clearance x 790m2.
• Israeli No4 AP Mines destroyed x 17.
• 120mm Mortar HE destroyed x 3.
Work History of QA MDD Officer [the Victim]
17. QA MDD Officer [the Victim] is presently the QA MDD Officer for [Demining group]
Southern Lebanon, in a position he has held for the last 12 months. Prior to this particular
contract, in the last 6 years, he has worked in Bosnia, Northern Iraq, Mozambique and
Indonesia on humanitarian and commercial MDD clearance projects; Annex F details QA
MDD Officer[the Victim]’s CV.
Work History of MDD Handler
18. MDD Handler is presently a MDD Handler for [MDD company], currently contracted to
[Demining group being subjected to QA], in a position that he has held for the last 10 months.
Prior to this particular contract, in the last 3 he has worked in Somaliland and Eritrea on
humanitarian and commercial MMD clearance projects; Annex G details MDD Handler’s CV.
Work History of Site Supervisor
19. Site Supervisor [name excised] is presently a Site Supervisor for [demining group being
subjected to QA], a position that he has held for the last 10 months. Prior to this particular
contract, in the last 3 years he has worked in Angola and Northern Iraq on commercial
demining / EOD clearance projects. Site Supervisor [name excised] qualified as an advanced
EOD Operator at the South African Defence Force EOD School in 1983. Following this he
spent 2 years in an operational EOD role followed by a further 2 years as an Instructor at the
EOD School; Annex H details Site Supervisor’s CV.
Management Supervision and Discipline
20. [The Demining group being subjected to QA]’s clearance operation is supervised by an
International Operations Manager and an International Site Supervisor is in over all charge of
all site assets. There are no reports of disciplinary action being taken against [their] personnel
on M/F 1272 task site.
Quality Assurance
21. Internal QA is a continuous process with daily QA checks and evaluations being
conducted by [Demining group being subjected to QA]’s QA Officer and senior site personnel,
there are no reports of any indifferent evaluation results on M/F 1272 task site.
22. External QA is carried out by the MACC SL QA Section [by the Demining group involved
in this accident]; for M/F 1272 the last External QA Evaluation was conducted on the 24th
April 2003 where Mechanical Preparation (ARMTRAC 100) was evaluated; the evaluation
result was good. For MDD2 the last External QA Evaluation was conducted on the 28th April
2003 on Booby-Trap (BT), N
o24, the evaluation results were good.
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Medical Details
23. QA MDD Officer [the Victim] suffered extensive primary fragmentation lacerations to his
left hand thumb, first, second, and third fingers and primary fragmentation lacerations to his
palm. Tendon damage was sustained to his thumb, which was treated and repaired during the
surgery conducted on the 01st May 2003. He also suffered primary fragmentation lacerations
to his face and minor abrasions to his stomach.
24. After undergoing the surgery and an over night stay in Najem Hospital on the 01st May
2003, he was released on the morning of the 02nd May 2003 on the provision that he
undergoes daily checks and dressing changes at the Hospital. Annex I details Najeh Hospital
Report (it should be noted that the diagram detailed is incorrect, as it shows the right hand as
being injured and not the left hand).

Account Of Activities
25. The following is a description of the after the accident. The information from the
investigation forms the basis of the description of events:
01/05/03
• 1520hrs - Uncontrolled detonation at [Demining group] Head Office corridor.
• 1521hrs – On-site stabilisation of casualty.
• 1522hrs – Initial accident information passed to MACC SL.
• 1523hrs – MACC SL Operations Officer informed of accident.
• 1525hrs - MACC SL Programme Manager informed of accident.
• 1535hrs – Arrival of casualty at Najem Hospital Tyre.
• 1535hrs – BOI Convened by MACC SL Programme Manager.
• 1545hrs – BOI leaves MACC SL on route to accident site.
• 1550hrs – BOI Arrives at accident site to conduct accident investigation and informs
[Demining group] Programme Manager of BOI convening order.
• 1645hrs – BOI Leaves accident site to move to MACC SL.
• 1825hrs – BOI arrives at MACC SL and briefs Programme Manager and Operations
Officer.
02/05/03
• 0845hrs – BOI departs MACC SL to move to Najem Hospital to conduct witness
interviews.
• 0900 hrs – BOI arrives at Najem Hospital.
• 0920rs – BOI leaves Najem Hospital on route to MACC SL.
• 0935hrs – BOI arrives at MACC SL and briefs MACC SL Programme Manager.
• 1350hrs – BOI leaves MACC SL on route to QA MDD Officer [the Victim]’s
accommodation to conduct witness interview.
• 1400hrs – BOI arrives at QA MDD Officer [the Victim]’s accommodation.
• 1500hrs – BOI leaves QA MDD Officer [the Victim]’s accommodation on route to
[Demining group being subjected to QA]’s base location to conduct witness interview.
• 1515 – BOI arrives at [Demining group being subjected to QA]’s base location.
• 1645 – BOI leaves [Demining group being subjected to QA]’s base location on route
to MACC SL.
• 1700 – BOI Arrives at MACC SL and briefs MACC SL; programme Manager and
Operations Officer.
03.05.03
• 0700hrs – BOI leaves MACC SL on route to M/F 1272 to view clearance site, collate
task information and conduct witness interview.
• 0740hrs – BOI arrives at M/F 1272.
• 0830hrs – BOI leaves M/F 1272 on route to [Demining group being subjected to QA]’s
base location to collate clearance information.
• 0910hrs – BOI arrives at [Demining group being subjected to QA]’s base location.
• 0935hrs – BOI leaves [Demining group being subjected to QA]’s base location on
route to MACC SL.
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•
•

0950hrs – BOI arrives at MACC SL and briefs MACC SL Programme Manager.
1400hrs – BOI briefs MACC SL Operations Officer.

Insurance Details
26. QA MDD Officer [the Victim] by the standard [Demining group] International personnel
conducting mine/UXO clearance activities in Lebanon. All personal accident and medical
expense insurance policies for [the Demining group] Davis and J Murphy syndicates at
Lloyds. A copy of the scale of entitlements is held at the MACC SL QA Section.

Details of the Ordnance Involved
27. The Israeli No9 igniter assembly incorporates a lead-shear arming delay, it is fitted
through a hole in the end of the mine and screwed into the wall of the charge compartment
and sealed with a rubber O-ring. The arming delay protrudes through the end of the mine
opposite the “U” shaped striker retaining plate. The arming delay is attached to a safety pin,
which is looped over the fuze body and retained by a plastic cap during transit for additional
safety. The striker is retained and secured by a “U” shaped striker retaining plate on which the
open end of the box rests.
28. The igniter is designed purely for direct pressure operation. To arm the igniter, the plastic
cap on the end of the igniter is removed; the safety pin is then removed. The spring-loaded
striker is retained until it the arming delay has sheared through the lead wire, which runs
through holes in the end of the fuze. The arming process normally takes several hours. Once
armed, the striker is retained only by the “U” shaped striker retaining plate; pressure on the lid
(in excess of 8kgs), simply pushes the “U” shaped striker retaining plate out which in turn
releases the spring loaded central striker. The striker then impacts with the percussion cap
which initiates and flashes through to the primary high explosives in the integral detonator,
which then transfers the detonating wave to the main TNT charge causing the mine to
disintegrate.

PHOTOGRAPH DETAILING AN ISRAELI NO9 IGNITER

[The investigators indicated that the “percussion cap” screwed to the left end of this was the
“detonator”. It is not. This fuze does not have a detonator attached.]

Conclusions
29. Based on the Incident Investigation the following is concluded:
a) MDD Handler [name excised] contravened [demining group being subjected to QA]’s
SOPs, [Mine Dog demining group’s] SOPs and National TSGs by knowingly picking
up and moving a blind and therefore very hazardous Israeli No9 Igniter from M/F
1272.
b) Site Supervisor [name excised] contravened [Demining group being subjected to
QA’s] SOPs and National TSGs by knowingly picking up, physically dismantling and
handing over to QA MDD Officer [the Victim] a blind and therefore very hazardous
Israeli No9 Igniter.
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c) On questioning both MDD Handler and Site Supervisor, it was ascertained that they
knew the intimate safety arrangements and method of operation of the Israeli No9
Igniter.
d) [Demining group being subjected to QA] were very fortunate not to have a Demining
Accident at M/F 1272, whilst the Israeli No9 Igniter was being moved and dismantled.
e) Site Supervisor [name excised] contravened the amended MACC SL Site Specific
Clearance Plan for M/F 1272 (dated 18th March 2003), in that he failed to conduct the
daily surface inspection of the surrounding area, following the flailing of the graded
spoil.
f) QA MDD Officer [the Victim] asked for and subsequently accepted the Israeli No9
Igniter from a demining work site, not knowing the full and therefore detailed safety
arrangements and method of operation of the igniter.
g) MDD Handler and QA MDD Officer [the Victim] have no formal EOD experience or
qualifications, whereas Site Supervisor [name excised] was an experienced EOD
Instructor / Operator.
h) The Israeli No9 Igniter detonated whilst QA MDD Officer [the Victim] was screwing in
the detonator into the igniter body, whilst walking along the corridor from [the
Demining group]’s Office in Tyre.
i) The Israeli No9 Igniter detonated when the percussion cap on the detonator came in
intimate contact (through screwing action), with the igniter striker mechanism. This in
turn caused the integral detonator to function in his left hand.
j) At the time of the accident, the igniter striker mechanism was not being held by any
safety arrangements, and was moving freely inside the igniter body.
k) The follow up on-site stabilisation and treatment of QA MDD Officer [the Victim] by all
[Demining group] personnel was conducted in a professional and expedient manner.
l) The BOI agrees with and accepts [the demining group being subjected to QA]’s
Investigation Report.
m) The BOI agrees with and accepts [The demining group doing the QA]’s Accident
Report.
n) The Mine Accident was a preventable accident, with MDD Handler [name excised],
Site Supervisor [name excised] and QA MDD Officer [the Victim] all being
accountable and responsible to some degree. Due to his previous EOD knowledge
and experience however, the main responsibility must lay with Site Supervisor [name
excised].

Recommendations
30. Based on the Accident Investigation, the following is recommended:
a) Amendments are made to all clearance organisations SOP’s detailing that under no
circumstances are any items of ordnance (live or inert), to be removed from demining
work sites without the prior permission of the MACC SL. All amendments are to be
submitted to the MACC SL QA Officer for approval.
b) An amendment detailing the above are made to National TSGs and presented to the
National Demining Office for approval.
c) All operational personnel working in Southern Lebanon receive specific and detailed
training (from their respective Training Officers), on the safety arrangements and
method of operation of the Israeli No9 Igniter.
d) All conclusions detailed in this report be distributed and discussed with all operational
staff within [the Demining group subjected to QA and the Demining group conducting
the QA].
Signed: QA Officer, Mine Action Coordination Centre Southern Lebanon

Annexes:
A. [Demining group conducting QA] Accident Report dated 05.05.03.
B. [Demining group being subjected to QA] Investigation Report dated 03.05.03.
C. IMSMA Accident and Casualty Reports.
D. Map of the General Area.
E. MACC SL Clearance Plan for M/F 1272.
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F. CV QA MDD Officer [the Victim].
G. CV MDD Handler.
H. CV Site Supervisor.
I. Najem Medical Report.

Copies to:
MACC SL Operations Department.
NDO.
[Demining group conducting QA].
[Demining group being subjected to QA].

Victim Report
Victim number: 513

Name: Name removed

Age: 25

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available
(insured)

Time to hospital: 32 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor, safety
spectacles

Long visor
Safety spectacles
Gloves

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
minor Face
minor Leg
severe Eye
severe Hand
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The BoI report stated that the Victim “suffered blast and fragmentation injuries to his face,
right hand, front of right thigh and left forearm”. His right eye was “bruised and grazed” and
his “right hand received a deep cut from the base of the thumb into to the palm. The right
hand middle finger was also fractured.”
An Interim accident report listed his injuries as:
•
•
•

Blast injury to face and right eye
Blast injury to right hand
Laceration to the right hand palm.
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•
•

Blast lacerations to the left forearm.
Blast lacerations to front of right thigh.

An IMSMA record sheet gave the Victim’s DoB as 09/06/78 and his time to arrival at hospital
as 40 minutes. It described his injuries as “Sub conjunctival haematoma R eye with erosion
intact. Deep soft tissue injury palmar/themar aspect of R hand. Lesser lacerations to inner L
forearm and frontal R thigh.”
Two demining group accident reports are reproduce (from scanned pages) below.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the Victim was a
QA officer and was unaware of the operation of a very basic fuze. The failure of his employer
to ensure that he was aware of basic safety needs is the “Management/control inadequacy”
listed as the secondary cause. The MACC acknowledged the need for better training, but
blamed the site supervisor for the accident. Given that the site supervisor was subject to the
authority of the QA officer for all aspects of safety, this seems a trifle harsh. In the absence of
any reason for wanting the fuze having been given, it seems likely that the Victim was
souvenir collecting.
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Anyone with hands on minefield experience in areas where MUV fuzes or the No.4 igniter are
present should be expected to be aware of the very basic way in which they operate. The fact
that the QA company employed people without ensuring they had adequate training raises
questions about other aspects of their QA expertise. The fact that the MACC investigator also
seemed unaware that the igniter he photographed did not have a detonator attached is a
further worry (but may reflect a difficulty with the English language).
Questions over why the fuze was lying in an area supposedly cleared by both a machine and
by dogs were not adequately answered.

Related papers
Other documents made available included the CVs of those involved. To preserve
confidentiality, these are not reproduced. The victim’s experience was wide enough for it to be
reasonable to expect that he would have acquired a basic knowledge of how a simple fuze
functioned.
The Demining group conducting the QA (for which the Victim worked) made an internal
investigation. Their report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
[Demining group] SOUTHERN LEBANON MINE RELATED ACCIDENT REPORT ON THE
1ST MAY 2003

CONTENTS
1.
Initial Report
2.
Injuries Sustained
3.
Interviews with [the Victim]
3a
Interview 01 pm 010503
3b
Interview 02 am 020503
3c
Interview 03 pm 020503
4.
Recommendations
5.
Conclusion
6.
Acknowledgements

ANNEXES
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.

Statement of [name excised]
Statement of [name excised]
Statement of [name excised]
Statement of [the Victim]
IMAS Accident Report
IMSMA Accident Report
Doctors and Hospital Reports
[Demining group] London log of events
CV of [the Victim]

1. INITIAL REPORT
This is a detailed report regarding the Mine Related Accident involving [the Victim] out side
the [Demining group] QA Office on 1st May 2003.
[The Victim] is the Mine Detection Dog (MDD) Quality Assurance Officer employed by
{Demining group] working on the UNOPS contract assigned to the Mine Action Center
Southern Lebanon (MACC SL)
His duties consist of the monitoring of both [Demining group 1] and [Demining group 2] MDD
assets through out the four OES Areas involved in Operation Emirates Solidarity.
During the Thursday the 1st May 2003 [the Victim] was involved in the QA of [Demining group
1] MDD Teams 3,4 and 5 on two different sites Booby Trap 166 and Mine Field 288 Grid 7089
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6702 close to the village of Majda-Jun in OES 1. These two sites are situated close to each
other and his time on site was between 0730 hrs and 0930 hrs.
According to the [Demining group] radio log the movements of [the Victim] was that he
departed from mine field 288 on route for Mine Field 1272 at 0935 hrs and arrived there at
0945 hrs. This change of schedule is not unusual in the movements of the MDD QA Officer as
the MDD assets are very difficult to locate and are sometimes not in the area they were
intended to be as ascertained on the weekly intentions given to [Demining group] by the
contractors. On arrival at MF 1272 [the Victim] established that the [Demining group 1] MDD
Teams had completed the daily operations therefore no QA was conducted.
At approximately 1155 hrs [the Victim] departed MF 1272 on route for the [Demining group]
Office in Tyre.
It is normal routine for all the [Demining group 1] QA Officers to process the daily reports at
the end of each daily field visit and [the Victim] tends to conduct this task in the comfort of his
apartment, which is situated on the fourth floor of the same building as the [Demining group]
Office.
At approximately 1500 hrs he was asked to come to the office by the [Demining group]
Project Manager to discuss some problems he had with his leave. After talking with the
personnel in the administration office and a very brief meeting with the [Demining group]
Project Manager he departed and walked into the communal corridor of the second floor.
At approximately 1520 hrs there was a loud explosion from the direction of the communal
corridor. All [Demining group] personnel then rushed into the main section of the [Demining
group] Office to investigate the blast.
[The Victim] was standing approximately 3m from the thresh hold of the main [Demining
group] Office door, dazed and bleeding badly from his left hand. Both [name excised] and
[name excised] rushed to [the Victim] and assisted him back to the office where they
administered first aid.
At this point [name excised] took over control of the casualty while [name excised] went to
one of the [demining group] vehicles to collect a trauma pack as instructed by the Project
Manager [name excised].
As soon as the blood flow from [the victim]’s left hand was stopped, [three people] assisted
[the Victim] to one of the vehicles parked out side where he was given more substantial first
aid from the trauma pack.
[The victim] was then taken direct to the Najem Hospital where he received emergency first
aid treatment involving an x-ray and then into surgery at 1600 hrs.
The result of the x-ray proved that there were no broken bones in his left hand and that he
had full movement in all five digits.
He underwent investigative surgery to establish whether he had suffered any nerve or tissue
damage and to remove any foreign bodies, which could have been embedded in his hand. He
was kept in over night for observation.
An [Demining group] employee [name excised] stayed with [the victim] until 2300 hrs and
returned the following morning at 0630 hrs.
At approximately 1522 hrs the [Demining group] Project Manager informed the MACC SL of
the accident.
The accident site was then sanitized to await the MACC QA Officer. After a short investigation
of the accident site by [name excised] it was discovered that [the Victim] had detonated a No
9 fuse normally associated with the No 4 Israeli Anti Personnel Mine. The remains of the
mechanical part of the igniter were located very close to the accident site. Also fragments of
the fuse were found in the vicinity of the accident.
2.

INJURIES SUSTAINED

Initial reports of [the Victim]’s injuries are that he has sustained deep lacerations to his left
hand including his thumb, three fingers and the palm of his hand. He also sustained some
tendon damage to his thumb, which was repaired during surgery. He has some nerve
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damage to his fore finger and middle finger along with some small fragmentation lacerations
to his face, neck and stomach. [The Victim] has been recommended that he does not travel
for at least two weeks and must undergo daily checks at the hospital.
3.

VERBAL INTERVIEWS WITH [the Victim]

During the course of the investigation there was a number of official verbal interviews with
[the Victim] involving the Project Manager and [the Victim] and also representatives of the
MACC SL Board of Inquiry. What follows is a short summary of the contents of those
interviews paying in particular attention to statements made by [the Victim], which has a
significance bearing on the investigation.
3a Interview 01 pm 010503
Shortly after [the Victim] had recovered from his surgery the [Demining group] Project
Manager visited the hospital to see if [the Victim] was ok and whether he required
anything. [The Victim] was still feeling the effect of the anesthetic and although very
tired was aware of the presence of the PM at that time. After some exchanges of
typical bedside remarks [the Victim] was asked if he knew what had happened, to
which the reply was yes. He was then asked where the igniter came from, to which he
replied that he had got it from a mine field. He was then asked which mine field, to
which he replied 1272.
[The Victim] was then asked did he pick the item up or was he given it, to which he
replied without any hesitation the Site Supervisor of 1272 gave it to him.
3b Interview 02 am 020503
This interview was carried out between [the Victim], {demining group] Project
Manager, [name excised] MACC QA Officer and [name excised] LAF QA Officer.
During this interview [the Victim] was not ready to talk officially and an alternative time
was rescheduled for 1400 that afternoon. However based on the information given to
the MACC SL QA Officer regarding the Site Supervisor the MACC QA Officer wanted
to confirm what was discussed the night before. The same questions were put to [the
Victim] to which he replied with the same answers.
3c Interview 03 1400 hrs 020503
This interview took place in [the Victim]’s apartment involving the same personnel as
the previous interview. The MACC QA Officer [name excised] conducted the
interview. [The Victim] was very cooperative and by now had remembered a lot more
about what had occurred. The same questions as the previous two interviews were
once again put to [the Victim] in which there was no change in his answers. He
explained that the Site Supervisor had given him the igniter after [the Victim] had
asked him for one. [The Victim] informed the MACC QA Officer that the Site
Supervisor had removed the detonator from the igniter with the use of two leatherman
tools. Both [the Victim] and the Site Supervisor had noticed that the striker had hit the
detonator but had failed to function. [The Victim] then informed the MACC QA Officer
that he had been assured by the Site Supervisor that the item was safe and thought
nothing more of it. The MACC QA Officer asked [the Victim] if he was familiar with
the mechanical workings of the No 9 igniter and its explosive content to which he
replied that he knew the basics but not everything. Once [the Victim] had been given
a full technical description of the igniter and how it functions he was amazed at how
little he did know.
[The Victim] was then asked if he remembered anything about the build up to the
accident. [The Victim] replied that although the events are still a little vague he
remembers coming into the office and showing [name excised] the igniter making a
reference to the fact that it was in very good condition and that the striker had been
activated and that it was fully visible at the bottom of the igniter. [The Victim] went on
to say that he remembered the brief meeting with the [Demining group] Project
Manager and that while on his way out of the office and while looking for something in
his pocket located the detonator. [The Victim] continued to say that he then
proceeded to screw the detonator back onto the igniter when the item functioned.
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4.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended as a result of this accident that all [Demining group] MDD personnel
involved in mine clearance or EOD operations receive further training on the dangers of UXO
and mines. At present the QA operation in Southern Lebanon has only one non EOD trained
officer, however as a result of this accident all [Demining group] personnel operating in
Southern Lebanon will be briefed regarding the conduct of a QA Officer.
An amendment should be made to the [Demining group] Office SOPs stating that under no
circumstances should live or dangerous items be brought or stored in any of the [Demining
group] premises. Any items of UXO or mines located in the field and required for training
purposes will be checked and cleared of any explosives by a qualified Technical Operator and
the item will have a Free From Explosives (FFE) certificate and be catalogued.
5.
CONCLUSION
This was a very unfortunate accident that could have been prevented and blame should not
fall solely on [the Victim]. [The Victim] is the MDD Officer for the [Demining group] QA
operation in Southern Lebanon and has not received any formal training in EOD or Mine
Clearance. He received this item from a qualified international Site Supervisor who assured
him that it was free from explosives and therefore safe. However he is at fault for receiving
this item without any FFE certificate or knowledge of the dangers of the igniter and that can
only be put down to naivety and lack of technical experience. It is not fully understood why
[the Victim] wanted such an item, however a very important lesson has been learnt through
this accident and through [the Victim]’s honesty will hopefully never happen again.
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Signed: [Demining group] QA Project Manager, Tyre, Southern Lebanon

Statements
The following statements have been edited for anonymity.

Victim
Statement of Incident at the [Demining group] Office on the 1st May 2003
On the 1st of May 2003 at approximately 11:00 hours, I was conducting QA on [Demining
group 1] MDD Teams at Mine Field 1272, supervised by [Supervisor’s name excised].
Upon my arrival I found that the MDD teams had completed their daily tasks and were busy
with the final measuring of the area searched. During this time I was talking to [Supervisor’s
name excised], who asked me if I wanted to look at a No 9 striker, the item was in remarkably
good condition. I asked [Supervisor’s name excised] if the striker was safe as we noticed that
the firing pin had already been discharged and there was no collar. [Supervisor’s name
excised] proceeded to dismantle the striker, he examined the contents of the striker and
deemed it to be safe, explaining that the cap of the detonator had already been struck and
showed me the characteristics of the strike markings where the cap had been dented by the
pin, therefore making the mechanism safe to handle.
I arrived back to Base location at approximately 13:30 hours, proceeded to have my lunch
and then returned to the office at approximately 1500 hours, where I performed my normal
admin duties and handed in all of my QAE forms to the administration staff.
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Mr. [Manager’s name excised] was sitting at his desk and I approached him with the above
mentioned striker, while [Manager’s name excised] was examining the striker he commented
on the good condition of the item. He then gave it back to me. I informed my colleagues that I
was now going to the internet café. At approximately 15:20 I was walking out of the office
doorway and reached into my pocket for my cigarettes as I intended to have a smoke. When
I put my hand into my pocket I felt the other component i.e. the detonator, so I took it out and
because I had been told it was safe, I did not think twice about it and proceeded to fit it back
together, then there was a loud explosion noise. From this point onwards I only remember
being put into the vehicle to be taken to the hospital. I vaguely remember parts of being
treated in the emergency room and only became fully conscious and aware of what was
happening from the next morning of Friday 2nd May 2003.
This is a true account of the incident.
Signed: [The Victim], MDD QA Officer – [Demining group]

Witness 1
Mine Incident Statement, [Manager 2’s name excised], Date 1 May 2003
At 1520 today, I was sat at my work desk in the [Demining group] office when [the Victim]
walked behind me and headed out of the office into the corridor. He had only walked 2m
when a loud bang was heard coming from him.
I immediately turned and saw [the Victim] turn back towards our office and his face peppered
in blood and his left hand bleeding profusely.
The bang drew the attention of all [Demining group] personnel in the office out into my work
desk area. Buy that time [the Victim] had walked back to just inside our office door.
I approached him and realizing what had happened stopped him and told him to raise his left
arm to slow the bleeding down. [Name excised] (AG Project Manager) called out for someone
to fetch a trauma medical pack out of one of the vehicles parked outside our office. I ran down
stairs and took out a trauma pack from one of our vehicles.
As I turned to head back towards the office, [the Victim] was being escorted by [Manager’s
name excised], [Name excised] and [Name excised] our Lebanese secretary. [Manager’s
name excised] had wrapped [the Victim]’s hand with a kitchen tea-towel which [the Victim]
was gripping in his injured hand.
We all jumped into the vehicle. I sat in the back with [the Victim] to my right and [Name
excised] to my left and with the trauma pack on my lap proceeded to re-dress [the Victim]’s
temporary dressing. I swapped the tea-towel for a pressure pad and bandaged it around the
hand.
We arrived at Najem hospital a few minutes after the incident occurred where [Manager’s
name excised] and [name excised], acting as interpreter, escorted [the Victim] inside the
hospital.
[Name excised] then drove me back to the office where [name excised] and [name excised]
were waiting for the investigation team to arrive.
Signed: [Manager 2’s name excised] QA Officer

Witness 2
Mine Related Accident Statement 1st May 2003
Statement by: - [Manager’s name excised], [Demining group] Project Manager
At approximately 1500 hrs on the 1st of May 2003 I was situated in my office in Tyre
conducting my daily paperwork. The office was busy with my staff completing their daily
paperwork involving the QA visits of that day. At this stage Mr [the Victim] was not present in
the room as normally he completes his QA early due to the nature of his MDD tasks and had
already completed his paperwork.
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At approximately 1505 hrs I contacted [the Victim] by telephone to request that he came to my
office to discuss some problems he had with his leave, [the Victim]’s apartment is situated
within the same building therefore it did not take him long to arrive.
[The Victim] entered the section of the [Demining group] Office in between my office and that
of the administration office where Mr [Manager’s name excised], [name excised] and Miss
[name excised] were situated. He then proceeded into the administration office where he
spent a number of minutes talking to [Manager’s name excised] and the two female
administrative staff.
At approximately 1515 hrs I asked [the Victim] to come into my officer where I had some
information from London regarding his leave. He sat in front of my desk where we talked for
approximately 3 to 4 minutes. After giving him the information he informed me that he was
going to the Internet café to down load an email that I had sent London regarding his leave.
At approximately 1520 hrs [the Victim] left my office and proceeded through the main corridor
of the [Demining group] Office and into the communal corridor of the second floor of the
building.
What seemed like only a minute after he left my office there was a loud explosion coming
from the direction of the communal corridor, I rushed to investigate the explosion to find that
[the Victim] was walking towards the main office door holding his left had, which was bleeding
profusely.
At this stage all the occupants of the office rushed to the assistance of [the Victim]. The
closest person to the scene of the accident was Mr [Manager 2’s name excised] who was first
to assist, he instructed [the Victim] to elevate his had in an attempt to stop the flow of blood.
On seeing the severity of the injuries I immediately shouted for someone to go and get a
trauma pack from one of the [Demining group] vehicles parked out side the building. At this
stage [name excised] was also assisting [the Victim] by placing a towel on the wound. Once
the towel had been wrapped around [the Victim]’s hand he was then assisted down to the
vehicle where [name excised] applied a more substantial dressing on his injuries from the
trauma pack while on route to the nearest hospital.
At approximately 1522 hrs I contacted the MACC SL QA Officer Mr [name excised] and
informed him of the accident.
The sequence of events during this accident happened so fast, however to my knowledge this
is an accurate account of the accident.
Signed: [Demining group] QA Project Manager, Tyre, Southern Lebanon.
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